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#### Disability narratives & individual resistance methods are neoliberal – the aff conforms to the contours of the market and isolates itself from broader critical analyses – that’s our first link

GILL & SCHLUND 16 Michael Gill, assistant professor of disability studies in the department of Cultural Foundations of Education. He is also an affiliated faculty member with Women’s and Gender Studies. Cathy J. Schlund-Vials associate professor of English and Asian American studies and director of the Asian American Studies Institute at the University of Connecticut, Storrs. Disability, Human Rights and the Limits of Humanitarianism pp. 23, 2016 [Google Books - https://books.google.com/books?id=njw3DAAAQBAJ&pg=

It is also important to recognize that "neoliberalism" also involves a form of govemmentality in which individual citizens are exhorted to "conform to the norms of the market" (Larner 2000, 12). In other words, not only is welfare state spending cut back. but individuals on welfa1'e are encouraged to take responsibility for their own situation. The inequitable social effects of such policies have been discussed elsewhere; essentially, the outcomes of neoliberal economic and welfare policies are the redistribution of wealth away from poorer people and towards the wealthy (Harvey 2007). Taking "individual responsibilitv" sounds like a reasonable thing to do, in many areas of ones life. But it is not a panacea for all social problems, particularly those caused by social inequality. Further\_. when it comes to disability, there are long-standing and deeply problematic individualist messages about self-sufficiency and the need to individually "overcome" a disability. Such messages immediately narrow the frame of reference for disabled people -- the challenge is not to create a barrier-free environment for all people, not to stamp out the collective aspects of disability prejudice, and it is certainly not to emphasize overlaps and connections between disability and racism, sexism, classism. heterosexism or other forms of social exclusion. Instead, a key theme of neoliberal govemmentality is for an individual t.o succeed "against the odds." "Triumph over disabilitv" narratives can make great news stories, for some audiences. because they fit neatly into broader cultural narratives about succeeding against the odds, overcoming adversity, and achieving success in a capitalist society more broadlv. However, these stories are always individualist, never collectivist. Narratives about the need for wholesale changes in the economic position of disabled people throughout society are not nearly as seductive and do not evoke such sentimental responses from an audience.

#### The 1AC’s performance of identity as resistance is coopted into the neoliberal fold – rhetoric is subsumed and the person become a data mine which destroys their movement – that’s the second link

**Adam Morris, Parallax 18(4) pp. 106-120, 2012,** Prof @ Stanford - Ph.D. in Spanish & Portuguese Research: 20th- and 21st-century Latin American literature; comparative literature of the Americas; philosophy and literature; media studies; translation studies; feminist & critical theory; trans-Atlantic Hispanic poetry. ["Whoever, Whatever: On Anonymity as Resistance to Empire", http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13534645.2012.714560#.VbLk0\_lViko] bcr 9-4-2016

Once, in the heyday of identity politics, identity threw up obstacles to capitalist domination, with minoritarian movements joining together to denounce US imperialism abroad and the neo-colonial status of oppressed populations at home, especially women, queers and people of colour. Identity was instrumentalized to obstruct the advance of capital by rallying opposition to the capitalist system’s routine exploitation of these populations. But since then, Imperial capital got comfortable with identity. Not only have the liberating possibilities of identity politics now mostly evaporated, identity itself has become fertile terrain for gains in the accumulation of capital. Technologies of neoliberal capitalism have produced a new stage of accumulation: the accumulation of identity as capital. Artistic responses to this new phase of accumulation, wherein capital’s incursion into the private lives of individuals is more acute than ever before, are varied. One in particular concerns me here: strategies that cultivate an aesthetic of anonymity. The Capture of Identity Charting the demise of hopes once expressed by identity politics is not my primary objective here, but a summary of what I mean will be useful. As David Harvey has observed, these movements, based essentially in the liberal tradition of individual freedom, are not dissonant with late or neoliberal capitalism. ‘Any political movement that holds individual freedoms to be sacrosanct is vulnerable to incorporation into the neoliberal fold [ . . . ] Neoliberal rhetoric, with its foundational emphasis upon individual freedoms, has the power to split off libertarianism, identity politics, multi-culturalism, and eventually narcissistic consumerism from the social forces ranged in pursuit of social justice through the conquest of state power.’2In other words, capitalism has managed to accommodate resistant political movements organized around identity, smoothing over historical structural disadvantages by co-opting the rhetoric of equality. The energies of these movements have been captured by the ‘neoliberalization of culture’ and have thus lost their oppositional character.3 Rather than combat and subdue movements for recognition by minority groups, late capitalism deploys ‘culture’ to co-opt and commodify resistance, in order to rob it of its revolutionary potential. Fredric Jameson has done much to illuminate this logic of late capitalism, which he satisfyingly describes as the ‘consumption of sheer commodification as a process’.4 Jameson and others have diligently explored the contradictions of late capital in the realm of images and at the level of the commodity. What interests me here are isomorphic processes of co-optation at the level of identity – itself increasingly regarded and treated as a commodity – and resistance to these processes of appropriation. The person in contemporary information economies increasingly functions as a conduit to wealth. The person is a mine of data. And this mine is not, like those of fossilized minerals, depleting or finite. As information, personal data transcends the renewable/unrenewable dichotomy that is generally used to categorize resources. Furthermore, the data clusters surrounding people have only become richer sources of profit: technologies, especially those interlaced with social phenomena such as online social networks, have created increasingly vast mines of data as the information clusters surrounding the person grow more and more robust. Crucial to its methods of control, data technologies have essentially determined the character of Empire.

#### New neoliberalism is the root cause of all systemic oppressions and threatens the planet – market control eliminates individual agency

Dr. Henry Giroux, Counterpunch, 10-23-2015, Giroux received his Doctorate from Carnegie-Mellon in 1977. He then became professor of education at Boston University from 1977 to 1983. In 1983 he became professor of education and renowned scholar in residence at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio where he also served as Director at the Center for Education and Cultural Studies. He moved to Penn State University where he took up the Waterbury Chair Professorship at Penn State University from 1992 to May 2004. He also served as the Director of the Waterbury Forum in Education and Cultural Studies. He moved to McMaster University in May 2004, where he currently holds the McMaster University Chair for Scholarship in the Public Interest. ["Culture of Cruelty: the Age of Neoliberal Authoritarianism", http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/10/23/culture-of-cruelty-the-age-of-neoliberal-authoritarianism/] bcr 8-4-2016

The basic elements of this new neoliberal authoritarianism can be seen clearly in the ongoing and ruthless assault on the social state, unions, higher education, workers, students, poor minority youth, and any vestige of the social contract. Free market policies, values, and practices with their emphasis on the privatization of public wealth, the elimination of social protections, and the deregulation of economic activity now shape practically every commanding political and economic institution in both countries. Markets now use their economic and ideological resources to weaponize and militarize all aspects of everyday life, increasingly held in place by a culture of fear, a pedagogy of repression, a banal celebrity culture, game show aesthetics, and a politics of precarity, control, and mass surveillance. A world of shadows, secrecy, and lawlessness now characterizes a deep state that is ruthless in its pursuit of wealth and power and indifferent to its plundering of both humanity and the planet. Terror is all nearly all-encompassing and disguises itself in the normalization of greed, the exaltation of the spectacle of violence, and corporate controlled consumer-soma machine that inoculates the public with an addiction to instant gratification. We don’t see the work camps or death camps that characterized the catastrophes of mid-century totalitarian regimes. But as a generation of black youth can attest, you don’t have to be in jail to feel imprisoned, especially when it is increasingly difficult to take to take control of one’s life and means in a meaningful way.

**Neoliberalist administration of identity is the root cause of oppression - marketplace ideology hinges on forcing bodies to compete and produce which becomes the metric for personhood**

**Writer Seth Ackerman, Jacobin Magazine, Nov-21-12,** on the editorial board of Jacobin and a doctoral candidate in history at Cornell. ["The Twinkie Defense, or What Does “Uncompetitive” Mean?", https://www.jacobinmag.com/2012/11/the-twinkie-defense-or-what-does-uncompetitive-mean/] bcr 9-4-2016

But the union got blamed instead, and that points to a fascinating aporia in neoliberalism. The competitiveness ideology keeps a double set of books. On the surface, it celebrates free individuals making voluntary agreements on a footing of formal equality. But look just a little deeper and it turns out to be a musty, medieval system of morality that venerates human hierarchy and inequality. If taken literally, an accusation of insufficient “competitiveness” would refer to a failure to buy or sell on the terms objectively demanded by the dispersed actors of the marketplace. But nine times out of ten, this literal meaning is just a facade for the real underlying meaning, which is all about policing the socially accepted rules concerning who is a worthy human being and who is not. Workers at an industrial bakery are losers. They need to take a pay cut — not so much to make the numbers add up (that’s a secondary consideration for all the commentators and columnists) but as a ritual affirmation of their debased social status. The refusal to take the cut was shocking and revolting — an act of lèse-majesté. It’s in that sense that the union was uncompetitive. The workers didn’t know their place. Corey Robin has often cited the political scientist Karen Orren, whose book Belated Feudalism revealed the feudal underside of the nineteenth century “unregulated” capitalist labor market. Here’s Corey’s summary: According to Orren, long after the Bill of Rights was ratified and slavery abolished – well into the 20th century, in fact – the American workplace remained a feudal institution. Not metaphorically, but legally. Workers were governed by statutes originating in the common law of medieval England, with precedents extending as far back as the year 500. Like their counterparts in feudal Britain, judges exclusively administered these statutes, treating workers as the literal property of their employers. Not until 1937, when the Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Act, giving workers the right to organize unions, did the judiciary relinquish political control over the workplace to Congress. Prior to the ’30s, Orren shows, American judges regularly applied the “law of master and servant” to quell the worker’s independent will. According to one jurist, that law recognized only ”the superiority and power” of the master, and the ”duty, subjection, and, as it were, allegiance” of the worker….As soon as workers entered the workplace, they became the property of their employers. Judges enforced the 13th-century rule of ”quicquid acquietur servo acquietur domino” (whatever is acquired by the servant is acquired by the master), mandating that employees give to their employers whatever they may have earned off the job – as if the employee, and not his labor, belonged to the employer. If an outside party injured an employee so that he couldn’t perform his duties, the employer could sue that party for damages, “as if the injury had been to his chattel or machines or buildings.” But if the outside party injured the employer so that he could not provide employment, the employee could not likewise sue. Why? Because, claimed one jurist, the ”inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior, as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior.” ”Belated Feudalism” set off multiple explosions when it appeared in 1991, inflicting serious damage on the received wisdom of Harvard political scientist Louis Hartz. In his 1955 classic ”The Liberal Tradition in America,” still taught on many college campuses, Hartz argued that the United States was born free: Americans never knew feudalism; their country – with its Horatio Alger ethos of individual mobility, private property, free labor, and the sacred rights of contract – was modern and liberal from the start. For decades, liberals embraced Hartz’s argument as an explanation for why there was no – and could never be any – radicalism in the United States. Leftists, for their part, also accepted his account, pointing to the labor movement’s failure to create socialism as evidence of liberalism’s hegemony. But as Orren shows, American liberalism has never been the easy inheritance that Hartz and his complacent defenders assume. And the American labor movement may have achieved something far more difficult and profound than its leftist critics realize. Trade unions, Orren argues, made America liberal, laying slow but steady siege to an impregnable feudal fortress. The hypocrisy of the competitiveness ideology is a revival of this old double-bottomed tradition: a society of equals on the outside, master-and-servant deep down. Let the neoliberals howl: this Friday at Wal-Marts around the country, workers will be storming an archipelago of little Bastilles.

#### Vote negative to retract from capitalism – brazen resistance fuels cap and fails to produce liberation – blueprints for change must be formulated outside of the system

**Adrian Johnston Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society 3(1) pp. 259-283 Dec 2004** , Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico at Albuquerque and a faculty member at the Emory Psychoanalytic Institute in Atlanta.[1] Johnston is one of the most widely followed philosophers writing today. Influenced by Žižek and his readings of German idealism, Johnston’s work has gained many readers among those making the materialist and realist turns in Continental philosophy.[2] Johnston’s books are guided by his “transcendental materialism,” which in sum calls for a materialist ontology that nevertheless does not reduce away the gap or figure that is human subjectivity. Johnston argues for retooling Freud and Lacan after the success of the natural sciences in recent decades, but argues that both Freud and Lacan presaged a lot of these successes. Critical of the thinkers of immanence whom he believes, following Hegel, can only give us subjectless substance, Johnston’s work has brought Lacanianism into the 21st century when many wrongly claimed it dead long before the end of the last.[2] ["The Cynic's Fetish: Slavoj Žižek and the Dynamics of Belief", http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/pal/pcs/2004/00000009/00000003/art00001] bcr

The height of Zizek's philosophical traditionalism, his fidelity to certain lasting truths too precious to cast away in a postmodern frenzy, is his conviction that no worthwhile praxis can emerge prior to the careful and deliberate formulation of a correct conceptual framework. His references to the Lacanian notion of the Act (qua agent-less occurrence not brought about by a subject) are especially strange in light of the fact that he seemingly endorses the view that theory must precede practice, namely, that deliberative reflection is, in a way, primary. For Zizek, the foremost "practical" task to be accomplished today isn't some kind of rebellious acting out, which would, in the end, amount to nothing more than a series of impotent, incoherent outbursts. Instead, given the contemporary exhaustion of the socio-political imagination under the hegemony of liberal-democratic capitalism, he sees the liberation of thinking itself from its present constraints as the first crucial step that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better. In a lecture given in Vienna in 2001, Zizek suggests that Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete action (thesis eleven on Feuerbach--"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") must be inverted given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, one must resist succumbing to the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all such rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are ideologically co-opted by it.

#### The role of the ballot is to engage in sustained class analysis – their theorization is insufficient to alleviate ableism

MOLLOW 4 Anna Mollow, received her Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley. She is the coeditor, with Robert McRuer, of Sex and Disability (Duke UP, 2012) and the coeditor, with Merri Lisa Johnson, of DSM-CRIP (Social Text Online, 2013). Anna’s articles on disability and fatness have appeared in Hypatia: Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Bitch Magazine, The Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly, MELUS: Multi-Ethnic Literature of the United States, The Disability Studies Reader, Autostraddle, and Huffington Post.Michigan Quarterly Review, Volume XLIII, Issue 2, Spring 2004 ["Identity Politics and Disability Studies: A Critique of Recent Theory", https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?cc=mqr;c=mqr;c=mqrarchive;idno=act2080.0043.218;rgn=main;view=text;xc=1;g=mqrg] bcr 4-29-2017

Treating disagreements about identity politics in terms of a divide between conservatives and progressives, Siebers ignores the ongoing arguments about this topic within the Left. For example, Wendy Brown suggests that "identity politics is partly dependent upon the demise of a critique of capitalism" (59). Thus, while disability scholars and activists are right to insist upon employment accommodations, a more radical analysis would also contest an economic system in which resources are distributed on the basis of the amount and type of work that one does. Only a sustained class analysis can address the reality that, in a capitalist economy, many people with disabilities—as well as some nondisabled people—will never be able to work enough to rise above poverty level, regardless of what workplace accommodations they secure.[9]

### DA

**The 1AC’s performative representation of narratives/historical analysis as evidence is a shallow request for us to buy in to the appearance of their arguments. This epistemology destroys the foundation of critical thinking and problem solving while promoting intellectual decadence. We aren’t arguing that the performance itself is wrong – we’re arguing that their performance is impossible to engage in.**

**Dr. Lewis Gordon, Disciplinary Decadence: Living Thought in Trying Times (no page #s), 2006**, American Philosopher - Gordon graduated in 1984 from Lehman College, CUNY, through the Lehman Scholars Program, with a B.A., magna cum laude and as a member of Phi Beta Kappa. He completed his MA and M. Phil. in philosophy in 1991 at Yale University, and received his Ph.D. with distinction from the same university in 1993. [Google Books] bcr 8-30-2016

A striking feature (among many) of the contemporary intellectual climate, as I pointed out in the introduction of this book, is the war on evidence. There are many instances of this, but perhaps most memorable are the many "charts" and so-called evidential claims made by Ronald Reagan during his presidency. The so-called evidence he advanced was rarely ever evident. We needn’t blame Reagan for this. It was happening everywhere. Think of the scores of pseudo-intellectuals who have mastered the performance of “academese” and the rhetorical advance of evidence like claims. Lying beneath all this are, of course, nihilistic forces, and lying beneath such forces are, as Friedrich Nietzsche diagnosed little more than a century ago, decadent ones. Where truth has collapsed into commonness**, then critical thinking isn't necessary**, which makes the work of assessing evidence superfluous. The effect is the kind of nonthinking activities against which Ortega y Gasset argued. There are two extremes of this. On the one hand, there is oversimplicity that demands no reflection. On the other hand, there IS the dense, abstruse appearance of expertise that conceals an absence of thought. **Both don't require thinking because their ultimate appeal is appearance**. ¶ Evidence is paradoxically that which has been hidden but revealed as a conduit for the appearance of another hidden reality. In effect, then, It is an appearance that enables appearance, but it is an appearance that requires thinking in order to appear. In short, it is not an appearance that stimulates thought but a form of thought that stimulates appearance. This means that evidence is always symbolic; it always refers beyond Itself. Because whether affirmed or rejected, it always extends itself publicly for assessment, evidence is peculiarly social. And since it is social, evidence is subject to the complex exchange of intersubjective activities. Evidence must, in other words be subject to norms" and "criteria." By norms, I don't here mean normativity or social prejudices but instead an understanding of where an exceptional instance versus a typical instance of a case holds. This requires further understanding of relevance, which, too, requires the value of distinction. All this together provides a clue to the contemporary problem. **When simply the performance of presenting evidence substitutes for evidence, then anything can count as evidence.** We see this in scholarly texts where the authors announce the importance of looking at a subject and then later argue as though that announcement itself constituted examination. Think, as well, of some texts in literary and cultural studies with long, run-on commentary in end notes and footnotes that serve no role of substantiating the claims they supposedly demarcate. We also see it in cases where pronouncements of past failures of certain social remedies take the form of perennial truths. Think of the current rhetoric of the failed social programs of the 1970s. How could programs that were implemented in the mid-1970s and began being torn down by the end of the 1970s be assessed as a success or failure? But at other levels, the problem of evidence becomes particularly striking. The 1980s were marked by rhetoric against big government. Yet, the bureaucracy increased by at least four times its previous level under those conservative administrations, while it was reduced under the Clinton Administration. Even before the war began, the current president, George W. Bush, made policy blunders that destroyed the surplus left by Clinton and began a process of increasing the size of the government which has been exacerbated by the “war on terror.” How is it, then, that we don’t have a national formulation of the Republican Party equaling increased government bureaucracy and government spending?

#### The impact is colonialism of ideologies which just replicates dominant systems – turns case.

Gordon ’14, [African and Judiac Studies at the University of Connecticut—2014 (“Disciplinary Decadence and the Decolonization of Knowledge,” Africa Development 39.1: 81-92, 88).]

The first is regarding the political significance of this critique. **For politics to exist, there must be discursive opposition over relations of power. Such activity involves communicative possibilities that rely on the suspension of violent or repressive forces**. In effect, that makes politics also a condition of appearance. **To be political is to emerge, to appear, to exist**. **Colonisation involves the elimination of discursive opposition between the dominant group and the subordinated group.** **A consequence of this is the attempted elimination of speech** (a fundamental activity of political life) **with a trail of concomitant conditions of its possibility**. It is not that **colonised groups** fail to speak. It is that their **speaking lacks appearance or mediation; it is not transformed into speech**. **The erasure of speech calls for the elimination of such conditions of its appearance such as gestural sites and the constellation of muscles that facilitates speech** – namely, the face. As faceless, problem people are derailed from the dialectics of recognition, of self and other, with the consequence of neither self nor other. Since ethical life requires others, a challenge is here raised against models of decolonial practice that centre ethics. The additional challenge, then, is to cultivate the options necessary for both political and ethical life. To present that call as an ethical one would lead to a similar problem of coloniality as did, say, the problem of method raised by Fanon. European modernity has, in other words, subverted ethics. As with the critique of epistemology as first philosophy, ethics, too, as first **philosophy must be called into question**. It is not that **ethics** must be rejected. It simply **faces its teleological suspension**, especially where, if maintained, it presupposes instead of challenging colonial relations. Even conceptions of the ethical that demand deference to the Other run into trouble here since some groups, such as blacks and Indians/Native Americans, are often not even the Other. This means, then, that the ethical proviso faces irrelevance without the political conditions of its possibility. This is a major challenge to liberal hegemony, which calls for ethical foundations of political life, in European modernity. It turns it upside down. But in doing so, it also means that ethics-centred approaches, even in the name of liberation, face a similar fate. 5-Lewis R Gordon -Disciplinary Decadence.indd 88 16/06/2014 17:32:49 Gordon: Disciplinary Decadence and the Decolonization of Knowledge 89 This challenge to ethics raises the question of the scope of normative life. An example of this is the presumed universality of the concept of justice. What many people in the Global South have experienced is that justice could be consistently advanced in the interest of profound suffering simply by rendering illegitimate the humanity of whole groups of people. Thus, it could be claimed that justice was achieved in the United States through the Civil Rights Movement and the legislation it occasioned or that it was accomplished in South Africa through the ending of legal Apartheid and the process of the Truth and Reconciliation commissions, or that the many former colonies that have become what Achille Mbembe aptly calls ‘postcolonies’.14 These **moments of justice** (or, as some readers might prefer, supposed justice) **did not transform the question of the human status** of black peoples and the presumption of humanness enjoyed by people with, or those who have managed to acquire, the special credit or capital of whiteness. **The result has been an effort to seek in normative life what is, in effect, beyond justice**. In fact, **the particularity of justice could be such that while necessary for a certain dimension of political and legal activity, it is insufficient for the deeper question of establishing a human relationship to human institutions.** If this is correct, a more radical inquiry into the decolonisation of normative life is needed along with that of epistemic practice. SK

### Case

#### OV – 1. Sium and Ristkes is miscut its talking about *indigenous storytelling* 2. Proves the link to the cap K because they literally throw in random critical philosophy to just try to motivate you rhetorically – Morris explains that cap relies on fragmenting different forms of resistance and bringing it together – it’s the assembly of that project – it combines different forms of resistance and oppression.

#### Your descriptions of disability and your theorizing prevents true analysis of disability and eroticize it as a condition – your literature is riddled.

Anna Mollow, Michigan Quarterly Review, Spring 2004 ["Identity Politics and Disability Studies: A Critique of Recent Theory", http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?cc=mqr;c=mqr;c=mqrarchive;idno=act2080.0043.218;rgn=main;view=text;xc=1;g=mqrg] bcr

But only by—well, glossing over some salient aspects of postmodernist thinking can Davis sustain his argument that poststructuralism eschews images of disability. For one thing, as the forced quality of Davis's opposition between the "schizophrenic" and the "differently abled" suggests, poststructuralist theories of sexuality are often constructed with explicit reference to disability—e.g., psychosis—rather than on the basis of its erasure. Many postmodern accounts of sexuality would be unthinkable without terms that evoke associations with disability: aphasia, mutilation, castration, and blindness. Of course, what Davis may mean to suggest—and what he argues explicitly elsewhere—is that poststructuralism's predilection for using bodily difference as a metaphor has stood in the way of theorizing disability as a social condition.[3] And indeed, the frequent use of disability as a trope in postmodern theory is troubling for many reasons. For example, disability is alternately de-eroticized (e.g., blindness as castration) and hyper-eroticized (e.g., bodily difference as sexual transgression). However, as Davis recognizes, these problems are not unique to postmodernist thinking; disability scholars have demonstrated that inadequate or distorted treatment of disability is typical of a wide range of theoretical, cultural, and political discourses.

#### The attempt to solve oppression through public and political action misses the point, it fails to recognize bodies that exist as invisible from the public sphere, specifically persons with disabilities, and makes any meaningful solvency impossible. Those who don’t engage in your method are rendered as apolitical.

#### Hedva’16 (Joanna Hedva “Sick Woman Theory” Jan 19 2016 <http://www.maskmagazine.com/not-again/struggle/sick-woman-theory>)NJW

In late 2014, I was sick with a chronic condition that, about every 12 to 18 months, gets bad enough to render me, for about five months each time, unable to walk, drive, do my job, sometimes speak or understand language, take a bath without assistance, and leave the bed. This particular flare coincided with the Black Lives Matter protests, which I would have attended unremittingly, had I been able to. I live one block away from MacArthur Park in Los Angeles, a predominantly Latino neighborhood and one colloquially understood to be the place where many immigrants begin their American lives. The park, then, is not surprisingly one of the most active places of protest in the city. I listened to the sounds of the marches as they drifted up to my window. Attached to the bed, I rose up my sick woman fist, in solidarity. I started to think about what modes of protest are afforded to sick people – it seemed to me that many for whom Black Lives Matter is especially in service, might not be able to be present for the marches because they were imprisoned by a job, the threat of being fired from their job if they marched, or literal incarceration, and of course the threat of violence and police brutality – but also because of illness or disability, or because they were caring for someone with an illness or disability. I thought of all the other invisible bodies, with their fists up, tucked away and out of sight. If we take Hannah Arendt’s definition of the political – which is still one of the most dominant in mainstream discourse – as being any action that is performed in public, we must contend with the implications of what that excludes. If being present in public is what is required to be political, then whole swathes [portions] of the population can be deemed a-political – simply because they are not physically able to get their bodies into the street. In my graduate program, Arendt was a kind of god, and so I was trained to think that her definition of the political was radically liberating. Of course, I can see that it was, in its own way, in its time (the late 1950s): in one fell swoop she got rid of the need for infrastructures of law, the democratic process of voting, the reliance on individuals who’ve accumulated the power to affect policy – she got rid of the need for policy at all. All of these had been required for an action to be considered political and visible as such. No, Arendt said, just get your body into the street, and bam: political. There are two failures here, though. The first is her reliance on a “public” – which requires a private, a binary between visible and invisible space. This meant that whatever takes place in private is not political. So, you can beat your wife in private and it doesn’t matter, for instance. You can send private emails containing racial slurs, but since they weren’t “meant for the public,” you are somehow not racist. Arendt was worried that if everything can be considered political, then nothing will be, which is why she divided the space into one that is political and one that is not. But for the sake of this anxiety, she chose to sacrifice whole groups of people, to continue to banish them to invisibility and political irrelevance. She chose to keep them out of the public sphere. I’m not the first to take Arendt to task for this. The failure of Arendt’s political was immediately exposed in the civil rights activism and feminism of the 1960s and 70s. “The personal is political” can also be read as saying “the private is political.” Because of course, everything you do in private is political: who you have sex with, how long your showers are, if you have access to clean water for a shower at all, and so on. There is another problem too. As Judith Butler put it in her 2015 lecture, “Vulnerability and Resistance,” Arendt failed to account for who is allowed in to the public space, of who’s in charge of the public. Or, more specifically, who’s in charge of who gets in. Butler says that there is always one thing true about a public demonstration: the police are already there, or they are coming. This resonates with frightening force when considering the context of Black Lives Matter. The inevitability of violence at a demonstration – especially a demonstration that emerged to insist upon the importance of bodies who’ve been violently un-cared for – ensures that a certain amount of people won’t, because they can’t, show up. Couple this with physical and mental illnesses and disabilities that keep people in bed and at home, and we must contend with the fact that many whom these protests are for, are not able to participate in them – which means they are not able to be visible as political activists.

#### The rhetoric of the Aff is proof. Person with disabilities vs disabled person- you let the adjective come before the person- in fact- you reduce them to mere bodies and not even acknowledge their personhood – independently outweighs and turns case.

[Disability Access Services Blog](http://blogs.oregonstate.edu/dasblog/)**, Ohio State University, Jan 31, 2015** [“Ableism and Language” http://blogs.oregonstate.edu/dasblog/2012/01/31/ableism-and-language/]msa

Ableism is manifested in our society in a variety of ways. Thomas Hehir, a disability activist and scholar describes ableism as “the devaluation of disability that, resulting in societal attitudes that uncritically assert that it is better for a child to walk than roll, speak than sign, read print than read Braille, spell independently than use a spell-check, and hang out with non-disabled kids as opposed to other disabled kids” (Hehir, 2002). There is an English proverb that states, “Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me.” American society attempts to condition children to be “tough” and to ignore hurtful words and actions. Unfortunately words do hurt, and negative words, bullying, and being insensitive can have a pervasive impact on individuals. Whether the words are used unconsciously or consciously doesn’t reduce the impact. Solorzano, Ceja, and Yosso (2001) explain this using their term “microaggressions,” which are the unconscious, automatic, and subtle insults directed towards a minority group. The insults can be verbal, non-verbal or visual. Often times these insults occur without the offender even being aware that their actions are negatively impacting others.. Research has shown that the cumulative effect of microaggresions can negatively impact both individuals and communities. Pierce (1995) explains the impact of prolonged exposure to discrimination, “In and of itself a microaggression may seem harmless, but the cumulative burden of a lifetime if microaggressions can theoretically contribute to a diminished mortality, augmented morbidity, and a flattened confidence.” Person First Language A simple rule to follow when speaking about people with disabilities is to acknowledge the disability, but put the **person**first. For example: “Person with a Disability” rather than “Disabled Person.” Person first language is a term and a movement based out of the disability rights movement and other advocacy groups beginning in the 1980’s.